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How can I change the favicon? Favicon is the favorites icon that is associated with your site and appears in the browser This invariantist position is itself grounded in an externalist conception of knowledge and justification, for which Engel argues most prominently in chapters 3 and 5. In chapter 3 "Choses Sues" , Engel brings together the main arguments given by Williamson in favour of epistemological externalism, and ultimately, in favour of his refutation of scepticism.
First, Engel endorses Williamson's view that knowledge is a mental state, individuated by external conditions. Engel then reviews Williamson's anti-luminosity argument against the KK principle, namely against the idea that knowing that one knows should be a necessary condition for knowing. Like Williamson, Engel considers more generally that one can know a proposition and be well justified in believing it, without necessarily having access to the corresponding justification.
The rejection of KK reappears in chapter 5 in Engel's account of direct justification pp. Rather, such a belief is immediately justified and, as I understand Engel's proposal, we would not even have a sense of what knowledge "feels like" if such beliefs did not count as knowledge in the first place. Another ingredient, which Engel incorporates both from Williamson and from Sosa, is the idea that knowledge is more adequately characterized as a form of safe belief than as a form of belief counterfactually sensitive to the truth.
But as Engel concurs with Williamson, that very belief can nevertheless be safe, namely true at close possibilities, considering that the sceptical alternative is not among close possibilities.
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The reason why the sceptical alternative is not a close possibility is precisely the topic of chapter 5 "La justification prima facie " , which gives the pith of Engel's neo-Moorean view and departs from Williamson's epistemology: on Engel's account, the first premise of the argument from ignorance is simply false, because our knowledge that we have hands overrides the sceptical possibility. Engel's defense of the Moorean stance rests on an account of what he calls prima facie justifications following in particular J.
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Pryor in "What's Wrong with Moore's Argument? Peacocke in The Realm of Reason , Oxford, , namely justifications that are certain, immediate, and nevertheless defeasible p. In this chapter, Engel gives an extended discussion of two modes of knowledge acquisition where this notion of prima facie justification plays a crucial role: knowledge by testimony, and knowledge by perception.
In the case of testimony, Engel agrees with T. Burge that it is rational to accept a testimony, unless we have prior evidence to the contrary see T. Similarly, in the case of perception, Engel argues that "perceptual contents give us prima facie entitlements to take things as they appear to us" p. On that account, even when the sceptic instills doubt in us, we continue to know, because the structure of knowledge compels us to rely on prima facie justifications.
As Engel admits p. In particular, Engel seems to agree with Pryor that our perceptual experience has a "distinctive phenomenology", namely the "feeling of seeming to ascertain that a proposition is true" Pryor , quoted p. For Engel, this is not quite a leap into internalism, because this does not commit one to the adoption of KK.
The way Engel expresses the point is the following:. Here, in my opinion, lies an ambiguity in what the KK principle exactly amounts to. The way Engel understands the rejection of KK in the book concerns primarily justification: we can have a prima facie justification for some proposition p , without having an inferential justification for this prima facie justification p.
Let us take an example. Suppose Ann has a conscious and reliable experience of the content of a truthful testimony like "there are railway strikes today" , and believes it. An external ascriber can adequately report that Ann thereby knows there is a railway strike. Does Ann know that she knows there is a railway strike? The same ascriber may deny this, because the ascriber may insist that, for Ann to know that she knows, Ann must be able to prove the reliability of her testimony.
I agree with this externalist intuition against the KK principle.
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But now suppose Ann has a perceptual experience of redness a case mentioned by Engel on p. Then I would readily say that Ann knows she sees red, and that she knows that she knows she sees red. In that case, the ground for Ann's first-order knowledge seems to transfer to higher levels, because it rests solely on the structure of her conscious beliefs including her declaring that knowledge.
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Although the point is alluded to in the book, Engel does not dwell on the difference there may be here between some varieties of perceptual experience and knowledge by testimony. Whether or not the KK principle is to be rejected, therefore, seems to depend on the mode of knowledge acquisition. The point matters, for a close examination of the book reveals that Engel's rejection of KK concerns essentially the mode of justification of knowledge, rather than the limits of awareness and self-knowledge.
In the end, Engel's ground for rejecting KK does not appear to depend on Williamson's anti-luminosity argument, contrary to what chapter 3 might first suggest.